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Abstract
In deciding upon whether to pursue an undergraduate education in the United States, a for-
eign student considers the expected probability of securing US employment after graduation. The
H-1B visa provides a primary means of legal employment for college-educated foreign-nationals. In
October 2003, the government drastically reduced the number of available H-1B visas, hence low-
ering a college-educated foreign-born worker’s probability of ﬁnding US employment, and possibly
discouraging highly qualiﬁed international students from attending US colleges and universities.
However, citizens from ﬁve countries are de facto exempt from the 2003 H-1B visa restrictions. Us-
ing students from these ﬁve exempt nations as the control group and other international students
as the treatment, we study the eﬀects of the 2003 H-1B policy change on the pool of international
applicants to US schools. We use two datasets: (i) College Board SAT score data on prospective
international applicants; and (ii) SAT and high-school GPA data on international applicants to a
single highly-selective university. Our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates show that restrictive immi-
gration policy has had an adverse impact on the quality of prospective international applicants,
reducing their SAT scores by about 1.5%. This eﬀect is driven mostly by a decline in the number of
SAT score reports sent by international students at the top-quintile of the SAT score distribution,
suggesting that the restrictive immigration policy disproportionately discourages high-ability inter-
national students from pursuing US education. Our results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations,
including the use of high-school GPA as a measure of applicant ability.
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Scores
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11 Introduction
Foreign students often study in the United States hoping that an American undergraduate education
will serve as a gateway to longer-term US employment. Rosenzweig (2006) provides strong empirical
support for this phenomenon. Borjas (2002) notes that the probability of ultimately receiving a green
card (permanent residency) was 26 times higher for foreign students than for those applying through
the random green card lottery. Bhagwati and Rao (1999) and Chiswick (1999) are among other
authors to claim that student visas are often used in hopes of securing permanent employment. It
follows that a foreign student considering higher education in the US will be aﬀected by any signiﬁcant
exogenous change in the probability of securing US employment upon graduation. Such a change did
occur in October 2003 when Congressionally-imposed limits on new H-1B visa issuances per annum
dramatically reduced from 195,000 to 65,000 for ﬁscal year 2004 and beyond.
The H-1B visa oﬀers many foreign-nationals with a college degree a legal, though temporary,
permit to work in the United States. It is granted for a three-year period, renewable for a total of
six years, and is only available to individuals in professional occupations requiring “the theoretical
and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge requiring completion of a speciﬁc
course of higher education.”1 As noted, the drastic cut in the H-1B quota beginning in ﬁscal year
2004 represented a marked exogenous change in US job market prospects for college-educated foreign
citizens. The H-1B visa cap was never binding in the years immediately preceding the policy change.
Thus, foreign citizens with undergraduate degrees faced no legal impediment to working in the US so
long as they had received a job oﬀer from an employer upon graduation. Legal employment became
more diﬃcult to secure after the H-1B visa cap became binding. The US government began denying
H-1B petitions, which generated an incentive for employers to withdraw (or decide against) job oﬀers
to foreign candidates and avoid the uncertainty of the visa process. That visa quotas in general
reduce US immigrant ﬂows is an already well-established phenomena in the literature. This paper
instead assesses how restrictive H-1B policy has aﬀected the average academic quality (or ability) of
prospective international students who face reduced US employment opportunity after graduation.
Section 2 begins with a discussion of past literature and motivation. Section 3 turns to our empir-
ical strategy, providing a discussion to motivate the empirical analysis, a brief history of H-1B policy
and legislation, a description of data measurement, and our main regression speciﬁcation. Impor-
tantly, college-educated citizens of ﬁve key control countries — Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and
Singapore — can acquire work permits that are close substitutes for the H-1B visa. Thus, workers from
1See the US State Department website, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1271.html
2those countries are less bound by H-1B restrictions. This allows us to employ diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimation to identify the eﬀect of current policy on the selection of foreign-students interested in US
education.
Section 4 presents the empirical results. We begin with a College Board dataset measuring the
SAT scores of international test takers. We ﬁnd that visa restrictions have reduced SAT scores of
prospective students by 10-20 points. Log-regressions suggest a loss of 0.6-1.5%. These eﬀects are
robust to controls for macroeconomic conditions and the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries in
the analysis. Importantly, College Board data also demonstrates that reduced SAT scores are driven
by a marked decline in the number of score reports sent from students at the top quintile of the ability
distribution as opposed to an increased number of applications from lower-ability students.
The College Board dataset presents a few limitations, however. First, SAT scores are not the only
relevant gauge of academic quality used by US college admission oﬃces, and some researchers argue
that high school grade point average (GPA) is a superior measure (Geiser and Santelices 2005, Rask
and Tiefenthaler 2009). Though we believe that the use of SAT scores may be more justiﬁable for
international applicants, it is of signiﬁcant value to test the robustness of our key results to the use
of an alternative quality measure. Second, although the College Board provides data on prospective
international students, we cannot be sure that all of them become actual college applicants. Finally,
the dataset is complicated by timing issues. We cannot precisely identify dates in which students sent
SAT score reports, which may be a problem for individuals taking the exam near policy change dates.
We address these issues by turning to an alternative case-study dataset of applicants to a highly-
selective university. This dataset provides a measure of standardized high school GPA, includes inter-
national applicants only, and is less encumbered by timing issues. Our case-study analysis uncovers
ability losses comparable in magnitude to those found using College Board data, pointing to the
robustness of our ﬁndings.
2 Literature and Motivation
Current political and economic debate necessitate better understanding of how policy aﬀects immigra-
tion among highly-educated workers. Politically, Americans maintain more favorable attitudes toward
highly-educated immigrants compared to less-educated ones. A 2007 CBS News / New York Times
poll (Preston and Connelly 2007) revealed that 51% of respondents believe US immigration policy
should favor people based upon education and job skills — results echoed in a recent paper by Hain-
mueller and Hiscox (2010). In March 2010, Senators Lindsey Graham and Charles Schumer launched
3a bipartisan call for comprehensive immigration reform that included a preference for foreign labor
with advanced degrees in science, mathematics, engineering, and technology. That eﬀort resurfaced in
February 2011.2 Nonetheless, immigration among highly-educated workers remains controversial. US
legislation favoring skill-based immigration has yet to ﬁnd majority support in Congress, while the
H-1B visa restrictions introduced in 2003 continue to be in eﬀect.
Economists have highlighted the potential for both positive and negative eﬀects from highly-
educated immigration. Those who focus on the costs of skilled immigration emphasize distribu-
tional concerns. Hira (2007), Miano (2007), Stephan and Levin (2007), Borjas (2006), and Borjas
(1999) all warn that highly-educated immigrants could reduce employment and wage opportunities
for similarly-educated natives. This includes, for example, the proliferation of low-paying postdoc
positions expected of new science Ph.D. graduates before ﬁnding permanent employment. Similarly,
Borjas (2007) and Borjas (2002) worry that immigrants alter the educational plans of natives and
crowd them out of science and engineering programs within universities.3
Even if immigrants are not explicitly crowding-out natives, it is clear that foreign-workers are
becoming more prominent in US maths and sciences. Stephan and Levin (2007) quote an American
Mathematical Society statistic that 40% of US mathematics jobs in 1995 were awarded to immigrants.
Levin et. al. (2004, p. 359) note that while the number of citizen science and engineering doctoral
recipients living in the US rose three-fold between 1973-97, the number of non-citizen recipients had
grown eight-fold. By 1997, 20% of US scientists were non-citizens at the time of doctoral degree
receipt.4
More sanguine views of highly-educated immigration focus on the far-reaching macroeconomic
eﬀects. Hunt (2009) demonstrates that immigrants are particularly innovative and entrepreneurial.
Compared to natives, immigrants are more adept at patenting, licensing their patents, and publishing.
This advantage of immigrants over natives is largely explained by educational diﬀerences between the
two groups (degree and ﬁeld of study). However, immigrants are more likely to start new companies
than natives are, even after controlling for education. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) provide concurring
evidence for the innovative gains of highly-educated immigration by focusing speciﬁcally on the H-1B
program. They argue that H-1B admissions increase Indian, Chinese, and total patenting in cities
2See Graham and Schumer (2010), Preston (2010), and Budoﬀ Brown (2011).
3Peri and Sparber (Forthcoming), in contrast, suggest that comparative advantages among highly-educated native
and foreign-born workers should protect natives from competition and mitigate potential wage losses. Similarly, results
in Kerr and Lincoln (2010) suggest that highly-educated workers on H-1B visas do not crowd out natives.
4Other authors are concerned about brain-drain: origin countries might suﬀer when skilled workers leave. However,
recent empirical evidence in Rosenzweig (2006) and simulation results in Mayr and Peri (2009) suggest that origin
countries actually beneﬁt from emigration, since emigrants often return home with improved skill sets.
4and ﬁrms that are dependent upon highly-educated foreign-born workers. Further evidence for the
technology and productivity enhancing eﬀects of highly-educated immigration can be found in Hunt
and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), Stephan and Levin (2007), Chellaraj, Maskus, and Mattoo (2005), and
Borjas (1999).
Freeman (2009) argues that the US’s comparative advantage in science and technology is severely
threatened by educational trends in the US and abroad. He reports that 29% of the world’s college
students were enrolled in US schools in 1970, but that ﬁgure declined to just 12% in 2006. In the
mid 1980s, 37.8% of the world’s students studying abroad chose to matriculate in US universities.
That number declined to 20% in 2006-07. These reductions will hit science and engineering ﬁelds
particularly hard. Foreigners represented 15% of science and engineering workers with a bachelors
degree and a third of those with a doctorate. Most of those foreign-born workers were educated in the
US.5 Freeman predicts that these trends together imply that wages of skilled US workers will decline,
as will the price of US high-tech exports.
Freeman’s analysis suggests that it is not just the consequences of immigration that matters, but
also the causes. Research on the determinants of migration ﬂows began with Sjaastad (1962) and
gained popularity after Borjas (1987). Most studies employ a cross-section or panel of countries to
assess the macroeconomic determinants of aggregate migration ﬂows. Mayda (2009), for example,
employs a panel of 14 OECD destination countries and shows that pull factors (e.g., high GDP in
destination countries) are more important than push factors (low GDP in origin countries) in driving
migration decisions. As immigration policy in host countries becomes less restrictive, both push and
pull factors become more important. Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007) provide a more direct test
of the consequences of US immigration policy over 1971-1998. Using a panel of 81 source countries
over 28 years, they report (p. 365), “The eﬀects of immigration policy are discernible and have the
expected eﬀects... An increase in 10% in the family quota raises immigration from a country by 0.3%.
The same proportionate increase in employment visas raise it by 1.4%. A 10% increase in the refugee
allowance raises immigration by 0.5%, while the eﬀect of the diversity quota is minimal.”
Less work has been done on policy’s eﬀect on the quality (as opposed to quantity) of immigrants.
For research on skilled immigrants, however, quality issues may be even more important than quantity.
Rosenzweig (2006) focuses on the determinants of foreign student ﬂows — an interesting case for analysis
because student ﬂows are considerably larger than other skill-based ﬂows, while there is no country-
speciﬁc or total ceiling on student visas. He proposes that students are likely to be particularly
motivated by economics — other immigrant groups are often driven by family ties, or in the case of
5See Freeman (2009) Exhibits 1, 7, and 10.
5refugees, by political forces. His empirical results support this view, ﬁnding that students immigrate
not due to a lack of educational opportunity at home, but rather due to the lure of greater economic
prosperity in the US. He concludes by arguing that foreign students go to the US in hopes of permanent
employment, even though only a fraction actually remains after graduation.
Chiswick (2000) surveys the empirical literature and oﬀers a theoretical model of migrant selectiv-
ity. He argues that migrants are favorably self-selected. If the direct costs of migration rise, or if ability
is negatively correlated with the costs of migration, this favorable self-selectivity grows stronger. Chen
(2005) provides a short case-study of the quality of masters degree students in a Chinese university
and their interest in migrating to the US for continued education. He ﬁnds that potential emigrants
were negatively self-selected during a less-restrictive policy regime, but positively selected during a
more-restrictive regime. However, the paper is vague about which policies were in question, and it is
not clear that they would have targeted and/or restricted highly-educated workers.
In short, there is little if any disagreement among researchers about whether immigration quotas
aﬀect the quantity of immigration ﬂows. On the other hand, researchers are less certain about eﬀects
on the quality of immigrants. For highly-educated immigration, the skills of those who decide to
migrate is at least as important as how many workers choose to do so. Sanguine views of immigration
are discounted if the quality of the immigrant pool declines, while US higher education might also
suﬀer. We aim to ﬁll this important gap in the literature by providing rigorous evidence on the eﬀects
of restrictive foreign-born labor policy (reductions in H1-B quotas) on the quality of undergraduate
applications received by US colleges and universities.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Discussion on Immigration Policy and Student Migration Decisions
Simple thought experiments demonstrate that restrictive foreign-born labor policy can aﬀect the aver-
age quality of potential foreign applicants to US higher education. The direction of the eﬀect, however,
is ambiguous and depends upon which tail of the applicant ability distribution is more strongly af-
fected.6
If high-ability students are particularly sensitive to labor policy changes, immigration restrictions
could reduce the average quality of international applicants to US higher education. This might arise,
for example, if high-ability foreign-nationals are simply more aware of US legislation. More interest-
ingly, suppose that prospective undergraduate students think about future US employment opportu-
6Kato and Sparber (2010) provide a more formal model.
6nities when considering US education. Further assume that low-ability immigrants are unlikely to ﬁnd
desirable US employment even in the absence of visa restrictions (thus making employment quotas
largely irrelevant to them), whereas high-ability immigrants confront US employment diﬃculty only
when immigration barriers exist. Immigrant labor restrictions would then have little eﬀect on students
at the left-tail of the ability distribution, but right-tail students would experience a decline in both
the ex ante probability of securing US employment and the expected net beneﬁt of attending US un-
dergraduate institutions. In both cases, restrictive immigration policy disproportionately discourages
high-ability international students from applying to US schools, thereby reducing the average ability
of the foreign applicant pool.
The opposite prediction is also theoretically possible. Suppose that restrictive policy induces US
employers to seek scarce employment visas only for high-quality foreign-workers. High-ability stu-
dents might then expect a reasonable number of employment opportunities upon graduation, whereas
low-ability students sense that few ﬁrms will work at securing employment visas for them. In this
scenario, it is the low-ability students who are most sensitive to foreign-born labor restrictions — em-
ployment barriers disproportionately deter the left-tail of the ability distribution from US education,
thus increasing the average quality of international applicants.
Altogether, it is clear that foreign-born labor restrictions can alter the average quality of inter-
national applicants to US undergraduate institutions, but the direction of the eﬀect is theoretically
ambiguous. As such, rigorous empirical analysis is needed to better understand the direction and size
of policy consequences.
3.2 History of H-1B Policy
The Immigration Act of 1990 (implemented in 1992) created the H-1B visa for professional foreign
nationals seeking temporary employment in the United States. Kapur and McHale (2005) report
that 98% of H-1B approvals go to individuals with a bachelors degree or more education. Though
government statistics do not record the location of an H-1B recipient’s undergraduate degree, Figure
1 oﬀers descriptive cross-country evidence that a 1% rise in undergraduate enrollment is associated
with an equivalent rise in H-1B visas issued four years later, controlling for country population size.7
7A simple log-regression of H-1B issuances (in ﬁscal year 2006) on undergraduate enrollment (in academic year
2001/02) and Population (2002) reveals an elasticity estimate of 1.10 that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero but not from
one. More formal results are available upon request. H-1B data is from “Non-immigrant visa issuances by visa class and
by nationality” at the US Department of State, http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/statistics/statistics_4396.html.
Enrollment data is from the Institute of International Education Data, “All Places of Origin and By Place of Origin
and Academic Level,” http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=28633. The World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”
provides population data.
7Given that foreign students study in the US hoping to secure longer-term employment (as evidenced by
Rosenzweig (2006), Borjas (2002), Bhagwati and Rao (1999), Chiswick (1999), and others), prospective
students should be sensitive to H-1B policy changes.
At the time of its creation, 65,000 H-1B visas became available for new applicants each year. The
cap was not reached until ﬁscal year 1997 and again in 1998. In October of 1998, Congress enacted the
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA), which temporarily raised the
cap to 115,000 for ﬁscal years 1999 and 2000, and to 107,000 for 2001. The 1999 limit was accidentally
exceeded by 22,000, an oversight for which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was
ultimately forgiven.8 The 2000 limit was reached six months prior to the end of the ﬁscal year.
Congress responded to the increase in demand for H-1B visas with the American Competitiveness in
the 21st Century Act (AC21) — signed by then-President Clinton in October 2000. The act had two
relevant eﬀects. First, it reduced the number of H-1B visas that counted toward the quota by exempting
employees of universities, nonproﬁt research organizations, and governmental research organizations.
Second, it raised the cap to 195,000 for each of 2001, 2002, and 2003. Those limits were never reached;
only about 78,000 visas counted toward the cap in 2003. AC21 clearly stipulated that without further
legislation, the H-1B cap would revert to 65,000 for ﬁscal year 2004 and beyond. Despite a trend for
progressively less restrictive labor laws, Congress did not enact wide-ranging legislation to maintain
the high quota. As a result, the H-1B cap has been binding every year in our sample since 2004.9
We assume that even though high caps were temporary, there was a reasonable expectation of
permanence — the trend had been for a rising cap, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
was forgiven for exceeding the cap in 1999. By Fall 2003, however, it was clear that there would be no
renewal. Most international students considering matriculation after that date (i.e., beginning in Fall
2004) would expect limited access to the US labor market. In our research design, potential foreign
applicants to US colleges can be seen as having received a “treatment” in Fall of 2003 (that is, an
exogenous decline in the expected probability of securing employment in the US upon graduation).
Potential foreign applicants from ﬁve key countries were unaﬀected by this treatment and the
H-1B visa cap reduction, however. Free trade agreements have created close H-1B substitutes for
citizens from Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore, and Australia. First, the North American Free Trade
8That is, the US did not revoke visas awarded to individuals in 1999, nor did the 22,000 additional visas count toward
the 2000 limit. See US Department of Justice (2000).
9As we explained above, all we need for our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis is the fact that the H-1B cap was not
binding prior to 2004 and became binding after 2004. However, it would be of additional interest to gauge the magnitude
of excess demand for H-1B visas. Unfortunately it is not possible to measure the quantity of visas demanded after 2004
— the US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) simply returns applications received after the date on which it
has obtained enough petitions to meet the cap.
8Agreement created the TN visa for professionals from Canada and Mexico.10 Although the approved
list of occupations11 is more restrictive than the H-1B, each occupation is associated with college-
degree holders. There is no limit to the number of TN visas that can be issued. Second, two free
trade agreements signed by then-President Bush on September 3, 2003 created the H-1B1 program
by setting aside up to 5,400 of the annual H-1B visas for citizens of Singapore, and up to 1,400 for
Chileans. Another bill signed on May 11, 2005 established 10,500 annual E-3 visas for Australian
professionals. The caps on E-3 and H-1B1 visas have never been reached (H-1B1 visas set aside for
citizens of Singapore and Chile are subtracted from the overall H-1B visa quota. However, unused
H-1B1 visas are made available as H-1B visas to citizens of other countries). Figure 2 demonstrates
that workers from these countries indeed choose alternative routes of entry. TN, H-1B1, and E-3 visas
have become more popular throughout the period of binding H-1B limits. Moreover, the percentage
of H-1B visas issued to citizens of these countries peaked at 4.7% in ﬁscal year 2003 and has steadily
declined to 2.8% in 2008.12
Since workers from Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore, and Australia have viable alternatives to
the H-1B visa and face fewer constraints in entering the US labor force, college-educated workers
from those ﬁve control countries seeking US employment should be largely unaﬀected by H-1B policy
changes. In terms of research design, foreign applicants from these ﬁve countries form a control group,
while all other foreign applicants comprise the treatment group.
Evidence that restrictive H-1B policy reduced the quantity of foreign undergraduates interested
in US education can be seen in summary data available from the Institute of International Education
(IIE). They report that undergraduate enrollment of students from the ﬁve control countries remained
constant (at around 25,000) between academic years 2001/02 and 2006/07. Conversely, US under-
graduate enrollment from treatment countries declined by 14% (from 243,815 to 208,581) over the
same period. Note also that markedly diﬀerential trends do not exist for graduate enrollment — the
number of conrol-country graduate students rose 1%, while the number of treatment-country graduate
students declined 2%. This regularity is especially informative given that individuals with advanced
graduate degrees (such as a Ph.D.) who ﬁnd eventual employment at US academic institutions are
exempt from H-1B quotas, while some professors and researchers can qualify for H-1B alternatives
such as the EB-1 visa. The descriptive evidence therefore suggests that restrictive H-1B policy did
10Canadians do not have to apply for TN or H-1B visas, but must instead simply meet the criteria to qualify as a
TN or H-1B type of worker. Hence, only a nominal number of professional visas are issued to Canadians, despite their
signiﬁcant presence in the US labor force.
11See NAFTA appendix 1603.D.1, available at http://www.consular.canada.usembassy.gov/nafta_professions.asp.
12Data is from “Non-immigrant visa issuances by visa class and by nationality” at the US Department of State,
http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/statistics/statistics_4396.html.
9reduce immigrant ﬂows into US undergraduate programs. We hope to augment this evidence with
causal diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation of the policy’s eﬀect on the average ability of foreign students
interested in undergraduate US education.
3.3 Student Ability Data
We use SAT scores as a measure of applicant ability despite the controversy in doing so. Many
university admissions oﬃces stress the importance of alternative criteria to standardized test scores.
Rask and Tiefenthaler (2009, p. 1) note that “The chief complaint against the SAT is that it is not
the best predictor of college success but is highly correlated with parental education and income.” For
example, high income students might achieve high scores not through ability, but rather by enrolling
in private test preparation classes or through repeated exam attempts. Though Rask and Tiefenthaler
ﬁnd that SAT scores are better able to predict college performance for some demographic groups, the
magnitude of the eﬀects is not meaningful.
Geiser and Santelices (2007), like Rask and Tiefenthaler (2009), advocate GPA as a preferred
measure of ability. They use University of California data to perform a multivariate regression of
cumulative four-year college GPA on high school GPA, verbal SAT score, and math SAT score. They
ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in high school GPA correlates with a 0.36 standard deviation
increase in college GPA. A one standard deviation increase in verbal SAT scores correlates with a 0.23
standard deviation increase in college GPA. Math scores were insigniﬁcant. Bound, Hershbein, and
Long (2009), Rothstein (2004), and Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003) provide additional SAT critiques.
Nonetheless, most SAT critiques focus on its ability to predict domestic student success (or they
choose not to distinguish between domestic and international students in the analysis). The SAT
for international students is oﬀered less frequently and in more geographically dispersed areas, which
should deter strategic test-taking and multiple testing attempts. Many schools that choose not to
require the SAT for domestic applicants still require them for international students, pointing to
college admission oﬃces’ continued faith in the exam as a primary tool for assessing and comparing
the ability of applicants from diverse countries and grading systems. Thus, we argue that the use of
the SAT as a measure of applicant quality is probably more justiﬁable for international students.
Our primary data source is the College Board, which owns the SAT. This dataset provides a sample
of foreign-national high-school seniors who took the SAT outside the United States between November
2000 and March 2008, dropping those who have dual US citizenship or are permanent US residents.
A student may take the SAT multiple times, but the data only records the math and verbal scores
10from the last exam that the student has completed. It also includes demographic information about
the student that he/she supplied to the College Board. Each available observation represents a unique
SAT score report sent to a US college or university. Students might ultimately decide against applying
to these schools oﬃcially, hence score reports provide a measure of the quality of prospective students
as opposed to actual applicants.13 We do not know the date in which a student requested the exam
scores be sent to particular universities, and we assume that they did so at the latest exam date.14
Since individual students are likely to send multiple reports from a single exam, the dataset records
several observations per student.
We are interested in whether the academic qualiﬁcations (SAT scores) of foreign-nationals inter-
ested in US education have changed in response to more restrictive H-1B policy. The appropriate
methodology is to compare the average scores of reports received by US schools before and after the
policy change. Unfortunately, information identifying speciﬁc schools is not available since the College
Board wishes to preserve institutional privacy. Instead, they attached user-deﬁned school character-
istics to the dataset. We know four characteristics: The region of the country in which the school is
located as deﬁned by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); the school’s funding source (public
or private); school type (e.g., research, liberal arts, etc.); and school tier (or quality). We then de-
ﬁne “pseudo-schools” by their type, tier, funding, and region. We aggregate individual score-report
information accordingly.
School type and tier characteristics are determined by the 2009 US News and World Report Guide
to America’s Best Colleges (USNWR). USNWR provides a single rank of US colleges and universities
that is determined by several criteria including enrollee SAT scores, student/faculty ratio, and aca-
demic reputation among peer institutions. It is widely-used by prospective students when choosing
a school to attend.15 The guide ranks institutions within four types: national research universities,
national liberal arts colleges, masters-granting universities, and four-year baccalaureate schools. The
ranking structure varies by school type in that the guide ranks masters-granting universities and bac-
calaureate schools within four geographic regions, whereas research universities and liberal arts colleges
are compared nationally. The College Board supplied us with the type and general ranking of schools
receiving SAT score reports. For research and liberal arts schools, we know whether a recipient school
was ranked in the top 25, between numbers 26-50, between 51-100, other tier 1, tier 3, or tier 4 (there
13Thomas (2004b, p. 1375) argues that by “Identifying the set of institutions where college-bound students sent their
SAT scores remains the most accurate form of revealed preference at the initial stage of the college-decision path.”
1499% of score reports come from October, November, December, and January exams. The remaining few come from
March and April exams that are only available only in select countries.
15See Griﬃth and Rask (2007), Webster (2001), and Monks and Ehrenberg (1999) for studies using USNWR and
further details about the guide.
11is no explicit tier 2). For the other institutions, we know if they were among the top 10, 11-25, other
tier 1, tier 3, or tier 4 within their region. We use this to create a harmonized tier structure. We
label research and liberal arts schools in the top 50 as “Top Tier,” 51-100 and other tier 1 as “Middle
Tier,” while tier 3 and 4 schools are “Bottom Tier.” For masters and baccalaureate schools, we place
the 40 top 10 schools in the Top Tier, the 11-25 and other tier 1 institutions in the Middle Tier, and
the remaining schools in the Bottom Tier.16
Summary statistics for individual SAT score reports by type and tier of school are provided in
Table 1. Table 2 gives aggregate statistics. Average math, verbal, and total SAT scores were 638,
552, and 1190. Higher quality schools receive better SAT score reports, with the best scores generally
going to liberal arts colleges.
For reasons discussed in the Introduction, we supplement our analysis of College Board data with
a case study of a highly selective college. Speciﬁcally, we were given full access to detailed information
on each international applicant to this school, including SAT scores, high school GPA, and other
personal characteristics. The data are available from 2001 through 2008. As discussed before, the
key advantages of this dataset are the use of standardized high school GPAs as an alternative to SAT
scores and the focus on actual applicants as opposed to potential applicants.
3.4 Main Regression Speciﬁcation
Data limitations do not allow direct empirical estimation of H-1B policy eﬀects on individual decision-
making behavior. The natural experiment methodology would require observation of an individual’s
interest in US colleges and universities both before and after the policy change — information that
is clearly unavailable. Instead, we can learn about the collective outcomes of individual decisions by
measuring the characteristics of the pool of individuals interested in US education before and after
the policy. That is, the natural experiment methodology requires aggregate-level regressions, given
the available data.
To identify the eﬀects of H-1B policy on the abilities of prospective applicants from abroad, we
estimate the simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model in Equation (1).
Scores,c,t = α + β   H1B_Restrictions,c,t + δs + δc + δt + εs,c,t (1)
The variable Score is our primary measure of the academic quality of international applicants,
16Students can and do elect to send reports to non-ranked institutions, such as community colleges and proprietary
schools. We choose to focus upon the four school categories ranked in the annual US News and World Report survey of
colleges.
12measured by the average math, verbal, or combined SAT score of reports received by pseudo-school s
from students who last took the exam in country c at date t. The model is speciﬁed from the viewpoint
relevant to university admissions committees. That is, it represents the average ability of students
from country c who have expressed an interest in pseudo-school s at date t. Given that students
express interest in multiple schools, it is not possible to allocate individual people into unique cells.
Individuals who send score reports to multiple schools form part of the average score for multiple
observations.17
The main coeﬃcient of interest, β, measures the eﬀect of the restrictive H-1B visa policy on the
quality of score reports received by schools from foreign students interested in US education, which
we interpret as a change in applicant quality. In our baseline regressions, we assume that students
taking the SAT in the month following a policy change are aware of that change, and hence take the
immigration policy change into consideration when deciding whether to take the SAT and send their
scores to a US school. The variable H1B_Restriction equals zero for individuals taking the exam on
or before October 2003, those from Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Singapore in any year, and those from
Australia at all dates except November 2003 through May 2005. The variable equals one for all other
observations. This implies that β will be negative if current visa policy has caused US undergraduate
institutions to see a decline in the academic qualiﬁcations of their prospective foreign students.
The vector δs controls for time-invariant ﬁxed eﬀects and idiosyncratic features speciﬁc to particular
schools while δc does the same for countries. Also, δt represents year eﬀects for the most recent year
in which the student took the exam. This controls for global macroeconomic conditions, time-variant
ﬂuctuations in the costs and beneﬁts of enrolling in a US college, common trends in test-taking
behavior, and possible changes in College Board testing procedures or score-release policy. The error
term is represented by εs,c,t, and regressions weight cells by their inferred number of population score
reports.18
There are two common threats to the validity of our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology. The
ﬁrst concerns the exogeneity of our policy (or treatment) variable. If the ability of foreign students
from our ﬁve control countries somehow motivated their preferential visa consideration, or if some
omitted variable is correlated with the variation of both policy and scores across these two groups,
the estimated β cannot be interpreted as causal. These scenarios seem unlikely. First, the return to
17Concerns about this issue are addressed in robustness checks in Section 4.5. For the case study analysis in Section
4.6, individual applicants do not appear in multiple observations.
18The College Board data is an unweighted sample within academic year, but is weighted across years. Each report
in the sample corresponds to between 1.4 and 5.3 reports in the population, depending upon the academic year of
observation.
13a restrictive H-1B visa regime was likely motivated by macroeconomic forces that apply to interested
immigrants from all countries. The US experienced a recession between March and November 2001.
The unemployment rate of native workers with a bachelor degree rose over 75% from 1.8% in 2000 to
3.2% in 2003 — the minimum and maximum values between 1994 and 2008.19 Section 4.3 more fully
addresses the consequences of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, but most macroeconomic concerns should
be accounted for by each regression’s time dummies. Second, variation in policy across countries is
unrelated to macroeconomic conditions. Alternative visas set aside for the ﬁve control countries were
a result of pre-existing or concurrently-negotiated free trade agreements. It is unlikely that removal of
these special visas would have been politically feasible. Moreover, we see no plausible story to suggest
that free trade agreements and the ability of foreign high school students are related.
The second threat to identiﬁcation would arise if our treatment and ﬁve control countries had
experienced diﬀerential trends in SAT performance prior to the change in H-1B policy. This would
cause our regression to erroneously identify a policy eﬀect that was instead due to diﬀerences in pre-
policy trend behavior. Fortunately, this limitation does not appear to aﬄict our model. Between
academic years 2000/01 and 2002/03 average SAT scores rose 4% (from 1122 to 1167) for treatment
countries that would later face H-1B restrictions. Scores rose a qualitatively equal 3.9% (from 1181
to 1226) for our ﬁve control countries. Pre-policy regressions (available upon request) reveal no
relationship between the trend in scores received by pseudo-schools and whether scores are coming from
treatment or control countries. Altogether, we believe our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy remains
valid.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results from College Board Data
Baseline results are in Table 3. Results for math scores are in columns (1)-(3), verbal scores are in
(4)-(6), and total scores are in (7)-(9). Each regression uses year ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation
for each dependent variable includes origin country plus receiving school ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors
are clustered by country. The second and third instead use school*country ﬁxed eﬀects with standard
errors clustered by this unique identiﬁer.
The estimated coeﬃcients on H1B_Restrictions,c,t when applicant characteristics are not con-
trolled for are negative and statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level except when the average
SAT verbal score is used as the dependent variable. The size of the estimated coeﬃcients suggests
19Figures are based upon our own calculations from the Current Population Survey, available at King et. al. (2010).
14that recent H-1B visa restrictions have reduced the average math SAT score of foreign prospective
students by about 8.5 points, verbal scores by about 10 points, and combined scores by 18.5 points.
To see if the results change when we account for applicant characteristics that might be correlated
with their academic quality, we add a variety of applicant characteristics as controls. The results are
shown in Columns (3), (6), and (9). Added controls include a school’s share of applicants who are
sure to apply for ﬁnancial aid, intend to play intercollegiate sports, and who plan to eventually earn
an advanced degree. We also include demographic controls for gender, race, and parental education.20
Reassuringly, the sign and size of the estimated coeﬃcients on H1B_Restrictions,c,t change little and
they continue to be statistically signiﬁcant (in fact, even more signiﬁcant than without these controls).
The only meaningful change in the size of the coeﬃcients concerns the average verbal score, which
rises a bit when the additional controls are used.
Webster (1999) argues that SAT scores of enrolled students were the most important determinant
of research universities’ USNWR rankings in 1999. From his published results, we can infer that a
one-point increase in SAT score corresponded to a 0.20 improvement in the rankings. Using the 2009
USNWR rankings of national research and liberal arts universities, we ﬁnd that a one-point rise in SAT
scores is associated with a 0.29 improvement in the ranking.21 If the average score among enrollees
were to drop by the same amount as the decline among international prospective students (roughly
20 points), it would be associated with a 4 to 6 place loss in USNWR ranking.
Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of Equation (1) but with log-scores as the dependent variables.
The results are robust to this alternative speciﬁcation, suggesting that restrictive H-1B policy caused
prospective student scores to drop by a signiﬁcant 1.4-1.5%.
4.2 Timing Issues in Identifying Average Score Eﬀects
The baseline results of Tables 3 and 4 suggest that US colleges are receiving lower average quality
score reports from foreign students as a result of restrictive H-1B visa policy. However, those eﬀects
could be subject to a number of timing issues that we consider in this section.
First, we explore potential seasonality in the data. Seasonality could occur, for example, if repeated
test attempts result in higher averages than ﬁrst attempts and are disproportionately represented in
20See Thomas (2004a) and (2004b) for variables that predict SAT scores for domestic test-takers.
21Webster (1999) uses a sample of 114 research universities. He reports a standard deviation of average SAT scores
among enrolled students equal to 129.55. The correlation between scores and school rank is -0.78. If schools are ranked
from 1 to 114, the standard deviation of rank would be 33, and the slope coeﬃcient would be -0.20. Our estimate comes
from a simple bivariate regression of research university and liberal arts college rank on the average of ﬁrst and third
quartile SAT scores of enrolled students among institutions reporting SAT scores to USNWR. Our regression produces
a coeﬃcient of -0.293, standard error of 0.013, and R
2 of 0.74. See Figure 3 for a scatterplot of the data.
15particular months. Since our dataset does not identify the number of times an individual has taken
the exam, we cannot control for repeated attempts, but we can account for seasonality by controlling
for the month and year in which an exam was taken.
The ﬁrst row of results in columns (1)-(3) of Table 5 repeat the regressions in columns (2), (5), and
(8) of Table 3, but replace year indicators with year-by-month exam date ﬁxed eﬀects. The second
row of results does this for the natural log regressions of Table 4. One limitation of this approach is
that the SAT is not oﬀered to all countries on all potential exam dates. This approach will also reduce
variation in the data and decrease the eﬃciency of estimates. Nonetheless, this robustness check could
be important if visa policy changes were correlated with SAT seasonality.
The results for math SAT scores are strikingly similar to those of baseline regressions. Without
seasonality controls (Table 3, Column 2), binding visa policy reduced math scores by 8.5 points. With
seasonality controls, the estimate increases to a 9.9 point loss. Both methodologies suggest a 1.2-1.4%
decline in math scores when measuring the dependent variable in logs. The eﬀect of policy on verbal
scores, by contrast, disappears. This mitigates the total SAT score eﬀect so that restrictive policy
reduces scores by 9.8 points (or 0.6%). The robustness of the results for math scores is especially
encouraging. One might argue that math scores are a better measure of foreign student ability, while
English verbal scores are likely to be a noisier measure of general intellectual ability. For example,
those who happen to grow up in an English speaking environment will probably score high.
Another potential timing issue involves diﬃculty in identifying the date at which foreign students
respond to policy. Baseline results assume that test-takers respond in the month following the policy
change. Column (4) of Table 5 instead assumes that test-takers respond in the month of the policy
change, whereas column (5) assumes that people respond two months after the policy change. The
results do not change much across assumptions, pointing to the robustness of our key result.
Finally, the College Board dataset unfortunately does not measure the date in which a student
elects to send a score report to a given school. This is a problem for our results if students who had
taken the exam before the policy change then respond to it by selecting a new group of schools to
receive reports. Column (6) addresses this issue by assuming that people apply to matriculate to
universities in the fall of the year following their SAT date. For example, consider individuals taking
the SAT in the 2002-03 academic year. Those taking the exam between September and December of
2002 will be applying for Fall 2003 matriculation, while those taking it from January to June 2003
will be applying for Fall 2004. Policy changes will aﬀect those who have not yet matriculated. Thus,
a policy change in October 2003 will aﬀect those who took the exam anytime in 2003, as students
who tested in the early part of the year can still respond by sending their score reports to alternative
16schools. Column (6) indicates that the SAT quality response to H-1B policy is again robust to this
timing assumption. The combined score drops by more than 13 points.
4.3 Macroeconomic Conditions and Country Exclusions
Estimation of (1) could be biased if US policy dates are correlated with country-speciﬁc macroeconomic
events or trends. We ﬁrst explore these potential biases in Table 6 by excluding countries that pose
particular concern. The empirical speciﬁcation is comparable to Column 3 of Table 5 — regressions are
weighted, cluster-robust, and include exam date ﬁxed eﬀects.
Column 1 considers countries bound by H-1B constraints that experienced unique changes during
our period of analysis. First, China and India are undergoing rapid economic development. Second,
Bulgaria and Romania signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Union in April 2005 and
formally joined the EU in January 2007. These developments could possibly deter students from
considering US education. For China and India, domestic schooling and employment options may be
becoming more attractive. For Bulgaria and Romania, the EU now provides less expensive schooling
and greater labor market access. Eliminating these four countries from regressions, however, does not
aﬀect qualitative results — coeﬃcient estimates are nearly identical to those of Column 3 in Table 5.
Our results are identiﬁed by a natural experiment in which the immigration policy change aﬀects
all but ﬁve key countries. Roughly two-thirds of score reports among control countries come from
Canadians, and another quarter come from Singaporeans. Columns 2 and 3 omit score reports sent
from citizens of these respective countries. Though this aﬀects magnitudes of the estimated coeﬃcients,
the qualitative conclusions remain intact.
South Korea and Australia are among countries that have actively tried to increase recruitment of
foreign undergraduate students.22 Time ﬁxed eﬀects control for increases in competitiveness of world
education, and there is little reason to expect that changes in competitiveness should attract students
from our control group countries more or less than students from treatment countries. Nonetheless,
the regression in Column 4 explores the possibility by omitting Asian and Oceanic countries — that
is, countries near South Korea and Australia that could serve as the primary source of their foreign
student body. The regressions continue to conﬁrm that restrictive H-1B policy reduced the quality of
potential applicants to US universities.
Country exclusions alone do not fully account for two further macroeconomic concerns. First,
prospective students from less-developed countries might be especially likely to think about studying
22See Palmer and Cho (In Press) and Kremmer (2010a and 2010b). Foreign enrollment in Australia has been relatively
constant over this period.
17in the US as a pathway to permanent migration and therefore be more sensitive to H-1B policy changes.
We test for diﬀerential eﬀects across developed and less-developed countries by interacting our policy
variable with a dichotomous indicator for whether the source country is in the OECD.
Second, though year ﬁxed eﬀects already account for macroeconomic conditions, those conditions
might have a heterogeneous eﬀect if economic ﬂuctuations and country-speciﬁc immigrant represen-
tation both vary across industries. For example, if prospective Indian undergraduate students are
more likely than prospective Mexican undergraduates to ﬁnd eventual employment with US Informa-
tion Technology (IT) ﬁrms, they will be more interested in the economic conditions of the American
IT sector. In that case, an economic slump in American IT would reduce the quality of prospec-
tive undergraduates from India, but the quality of prospective Mexican students would remain fairly
constant. Diﬀerences in country-speciﬁc immigrant representation in US industries could therefore
generate a heterogeneous eﬀect of US macroeconomic ﬂuctuations across origin-countries, subjecting
our estimates to omitted variable bias.23
To control for this potential heterogeneity, we ﬁrst record BEA data on US industrial output (GDP)
produced in each of 19 aggregated sectors24 in each year of our dataset (GDPi,t, where i =industry and
t =year). Second, we use Census data from King et. al. (2010) to calculate the fraction of an origin-
country’s highly-educated US migrant workforce employed in each industry in 2000 (Lc,i,2000/Lc,2000,
where Lc,2000 represents the total number of highly-educated US immigrant workers from country c
in 2000). Third, we use these proportions to compute the weighted-average of industry-level US GDP
relevant to a highly-educated potential US immigrant worker from country c in year t:









This weighted average accounts for diﬀerences in the industrial distribution of highly-educated
23A political economy argument could suggest a related problem of endogenous correlation between restrictive H-1B
policy and the heterogeneous eﬀect of US macroeconomic ﬂuctuations across source countries. In our example of Indian
and Mexican immigration to the US, deteriorating conditions in the IT sector could lead to a reduction in available H-1B
visas since the industry would be less able to lobby against barriers to migration. Thus, sectoral economic shocks could
be correlated with visa policy. Nonetheless, we believe such bias is less serious in our natural experimental framework
since our policy eﬀect is identiﬁed by selective country exemptions from restrictive immigration policy due to free trade
agreements — even if visa restrictions were endogenously determined by reduced lobbying for freer immigration, it is
diﬃcult to develop a sensible theory in which reduced lobbying determined both the visa restrictions and the selective
exemption of our ﬁve control nations. In other words, we are fairly conﬁdent that political economy theories of endogenous
visa policy will not be a major threat to our analysis, given our natural experiment framework.
24Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing, and hunting; Mining; Utilities; Construction; Manufacturing; Wholesale trade; Retail
trade; Transportation and warehousing, excluding Postal Service; Information; Finance and insurance; Real estate and
rental and leasing; Professional and technical services; Management of companies and enterprises; Administrative and
waste services; Educational services; Health care and social assistance; Arts, entertainment, and recreation; Accommo-
dation and food services; Other services, except government.
18US immigrants across source countries, capturing the US macroeconomic conditions in year t that
are speciﬁc to highly-educated potential US migrants from country c. In other words, it reﬂects
the relevant health of the US economy anticipated by potential immigrant workers if they expect to
enter the same industries as their fellow countrymen but are aware of industry-speciﬁc macro shocks.
Country-speciﬁc industrial share values vary substantially across origin-countries. For example, 25% of
Indian-born college-educated US employees worked in the Professional and Technical Services industry
(a sector that includes computer systems design and related services), whereas only 8% of Mexican-
born college-educated workers were in this sector. It is therefore reasonable to expect economic shocks
to Technical Services to have a diﬀerential eﬀect on treatment versus control countries in our sample.
Column (5) displays the results for regressions with our added controls. Note that regressions
use ﬁxed eﬀects so that the coeﬃcients are identiﬁed by changes within a country (the model cannot
identify a coeﬃcient on an OECD indicator alone). Most importantly, the controls do little to alter
the coeﬃcients on the policy variable — results are quite similar to those of comparable speciﬁcations
in Column (3) of Table 5.25 As such, our key ﬁnding of restrictive H-1B policy’s adverse eﬀect on
the quality of international applications to US schools is robust to these additional macroeconomic
concerns.
Column (5) does reveal a few noteworthy ﬁndings, however. First, the estimated coeﬃcient on
the OECD interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant when SAT scores are measured in levels, and
it is nearly signiﬁcant when measured in logs. SAT scores from developed countries are indeed less
aﬀected by restrictive immigration policy than low income countries are. (The policy eﬀect for OECD
source countries equals the sum of the coeﬃcients on the policy variable and the interaction term, and
is insigniﬁcant.) In other words, potential applicants from low income countries are more sensitive
to diminished labor market opportunities. Second, results for eﬀects from industry GDP are more
mixed. When SAT scores are measured in levels, results suggest that ﬂuctuations in anticipated US
macroeconomic conditions may have some positive eﬀect on the academic qualiﬁcations of prospective
foreign student applications — a one percent increase in weighted industry GDP is associated with a
5.8-point drop in SAT scores. However, the coeﬃcient is far from signiﬁcant in the log-SAT regression.
In sum, even if sectoral economic conditions aﬀect residents of some countries more than others, such
ﬂuctuations have no bearing on the relationship between restrictive immigration policy and the quality
of potential undergraduate students.
25Note that some observations are lost by insuﬃcient Census immigration data.
194.4 Compositional and Demographic Eﬀects
The College Board dataset is rich enough that we can explore a number of additional issues surrounding
the eﬀects of the restrictive H-1B policy. First, Table 7 assesses whether the eﬀects diﬀer across type
and quality of institution. Policy seems to have been least harmful for research schools, which saw
an SAT point drop of just 7.5 points. Liberal Arts and Masters Granting schools saw declines about
double that eﬀect. Baccalaureate losses were even larger, though we caution that only 1.6% of score
reports are sent to Baccalaureate institutions. Not surprisingly, elite schools are less harmed by policy
than middle and bottom tier institutions. In the ﬁnal set of results, we diﬀerentiate top research
schools from all others. The general eﬀect of restrictive policy was to reduce SAT scores of potential
students by 14 points. Top Research schools mitigated this decline by a signiﬁcant 8.4, but still suﬀered
losses.
Table 8 explores policy’s eﬀect on the demographic composition of potential applicants. These
results might be particularly relevant for institutions who use international students to alter the
diversity of their student body. Column (1) considers gender composition — visa restrictions have
had no eﬀect. The next four columns explore racial composition. Restrictive H-1B policy has come
at the expense of Asian applicants. The share of score reports from international Asian students
has decreased by 7.6 percentage points. Whites, in contrast, saw a 5.9 percentage-point increase in
applicant share. In interpreting these coeﬃcients, however, recall that regressions already control for
country of origin (by school) ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, racial composition eﬀects are driven by variation of
application rates of students within countries.
Column (6) shows that restrictive H-1B policy has actually increased the proportion of applicants
intending to continue their education after obtaining a bachelors degree. This is not at all surprising
given that students pursuing graduate work would not want or need an H-1B visa to matriculate at
a graduate school. In addition, we have already noted that those with advanced graduate degrees
employed at academic institutions are exempt from H-1B quotas.26
Finally, column (7) suggests that the policy change has caused foreign demand for ﬁnancial aid to
increase. Foreign applicants facing a decline in the expected beneﬁt of graduating from US colleges
26In principle, we could analyze whether H-1B restrictions aﬀect the quality of the international graduate school
applicant pool. GRE data would permit the most direct assessment, but the Education Testing Service — owners of the
GRE — would not provide the necessary data. We have performed unreported regressions using SAT data to explore
diﬀerential policy eﬀects between students who intend to pursue advanced degrees and other students, but we ﬁnd that
both groups experience equal declines in SAT scores. It is possible that low-quality international applicants hedge against
restrictive H-1B visa policy by changing their post-graduation plans from seeking immediate employment to enrolling in
graduate degree programs. Hence, the average quality of the total pool of international graduate applicants can fall even
if committed graduate degree seekers (i.e., those whose relevant decision is not about whether to seek graduate degrees,
but rather about where to earn their graduate degrees) are unaﬀected by the H-1B visa policy change.
20now ﬁnd US education relatively more costly. One response has been to demand a price discount in
the form of ﬁnancial aid.
4.5 Quintile Regressions
While baseline results eﬀectively established that universities have seen a decline in average applicant
ability in response to H-1B visa restrictions, they are not informative about the parts of the ability
distribution most aﬀected. Colleges and policy-makers might have a particular interest in whether
the observed drop in average ability comes mostly from reduced interest among high-ability students
or a rise in applications from low-ability students. To address this issue, we divide score reports into
quintiles of the ability distribution of the pre-binding policy period (exams taken on or before Spring
2003).27 We then calculate the share (r) of a pseudo-school’s reports (R) from country c at time t
belonging to each quintile q. That is, rs,c,t,q =
Rs,c,t,q




Panel A of Table 9 summarizes our baseline quintile results. The ﬁrst row displays the eﬀects of
binding H-1B policy found by regressing rs,c,t,q on the policy variable and our usual array of ﬁxed
eﬀects at each quintile.28 The eﬀects are particularly strong at the tails of the ability distribution
— restrictive immigration policy reduces the number of score reports received by US schools from
the weakest and strongest students. The proportion of lowest-ability reports declined 3.3 percentage
points due to H-1B visa restrictions, helping to reject the hypothesis that the observed drop in average
ability comes from the proliferation of weak applications. In addition, the proportion of highest-ability
score reports dropped 1.8 percentage points. The decline in average SAT scores therefore appears to
be attributable to reduced interest among high-ability students — a result that is especially worrisome
from a policy-maker point of view.
We check the robustness of this result by considering an alternative speciﬁcation. We replace the
denominator of our dependent variable (rs,c,t,q) with ¯ Rs,c — the average number of score reports received
by school s from country c in a given time period. Since this value is ﬁxed across time, it is robust to
any possible eﬀect of restrictive policy on the total number of score reports sent — all estimated eﬀects
occur through the number of reports sent at a given quintile. The second row of Panel A reports the
results of this alternative speciﬁcation and conﬁrms that restrictive policy is reducing the number of
score reports received from both the lowest and highest-ability foreign students.
Panel B of Table 9 provides further evidence on the source of the score report declines. In principle,
27For simplicity, we drop reports for the 1% of exams taken during March and April.
28Regressions continue to cluster on school*country cells, but are not weighted by the total number of score reports
received since this value now appears in the dependent variable.
21international students can respond to restrictive policy through two adjustments. We have implicitly
assumed that students react through the extensive margin — i.e., that restrictive policy reduces the
number of international applicants to US schools. Students might also respond on the intensive
margin, however. That is, a student intending to pursue a US undergraduate degree might react to
policy by changing the total number of applications he/she sends. The costs of H-1B restrictions
are less concerning if policy aﬀects the intensive margin (fewer SAT score reports per applicant) but
not the extensive margin (the total number of students interest in US education). Panel B of Table 9
explores this issue and accounts for intensive margin adjustment by controlling for the average number
of applications sent by each applicant. Estimated coeﬃcients on our H-1B visa policy variable are
insensitive to this control. In other words, the policy-induced decline in top-quintile score reports
is driven by a fall in the actual number of international students interested in US undergraduate
education.29
4.6 Case Study
The College Board data presents three remaining problems. First, it provides only one measure of
ability — SAT scores — which some researchers consider an inferior measure of applicant ability as
compared to high school GPA (though these critiques are usually aimed at evaluations of domestic
applicants). Second, the College Board data cannot be strictly interpreted as a sample of foreign
applicants, but is rather a sample of foreign prospective applicants. This is because it includes both
applicants and those who sent SAT scores to US schools but later declined to submit a formal and
complete application. We cannot distinguish between these two groups of individuals in the College
Board data. Third, results may be confounded by remaining timing issues including the challenge of
precisely identifying the dates in which individual behavior would respond to a policy change.
Our second dataset is assembled to account for these problems. It includes every foreign-national
oﬃcially applying to matriculate at a particular highly-selective university between Fall 2001 and Fall
2008. As in the case of the College Board data, we drop individuals who have dual US citizenship or are
permanent US residents. The use of the applicant data (as opposed to the College Board’s prospective
student data) reduces ambiguity surrounding the timing of international applicants’ awareness of H-
1B policy changes since students should be aware of the current policy at the time of application
29Though not reported, the estimated coeﬃcients on the average number of score reports sent are positively correlated
with high quintile applications and negatively correlated with low quintile applications. Concerns about intensive versus
extensive margin adjustment are less relevant to the rest of our analysis, though we have included this control in our
average applicant quality regressions to test the robustness of our results (except for the case study in which we have no
data on the number of schools to which an individual foreign applicant applied). Reassuringly, we found little change in
our key results.
22submission.30 Finally, the dataset also includes a measure of high school GPA. Raw GPAs would
be greatly confounded by grading system diﬀerences across countries. Fortunately, this university’s
admissions oﬃce — using their long experience with overseas high schools — resolved this issue by
converting raw values into an internationally comparable GPA measured on a four point scale. Values
therefore represent GPAs that this university uses to evaluate international applicants.
Our regression methodology is similar to the speciﬁcation in (1). The dependent variables now
reﬂect the average abilities of applicants to this particular university. Observations vary by country of
origin and year of application. The model includes both country and year ﬁxed eﬀects but obviously
omits institutional controls. Regressions weight observations by the total number of applicants from
country c at year t, and standard errors are clustered by country. For the policy variable, we now
assume that students perceived H-1B policy to be non-binding if they applied to enter college before
2004, if they applied from Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Singapore in any year, or if they were from
Australia applying to enter college in any year except 2004.
Table 10 provides results for dependent variables measured in both levels and logs. As in the
prospective applicant regressions controlling for seasonality, the policy eﬀects are again most prominent
for math scores. Column (1) demonstrates that the math SAT scores of applicants from countries
subject to binding H-1B constraints have declined by 13 points relative to the scores among applicants
from countries who have H-1B alternatives. Measured in logs, this suggests a 2.2% decline in average
ability of international applicants. For overall SAT scores, in contrast, the estimate is negative but not
statistically diﬀerent from zero. This may be due to sample size, which is much smaller than with the
College Board dataset. It is worth emphasizing that the point estimates of the total score penalty in
percentage terms is quite similar in the two samples. For prospective international applicants, H-1B
restrictions reduced total scores by about 1.5%. For this university’s actual applicants, scores reduced
by 1.2%.
Perhaps most importantly, Column (4) presents the results using high school GPA. We again see
evidence that restrictive H-1B policy is reducing the quality of international applicants. The average
GPA of international applicants at this university declined by 0.09 points, or 2.8% when measured in
logs — a magnitude higher than that of any of the SAT regressions. The estimated eﬀects on average
GPA of restrictive H-1B policy are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
30For example, we assume that all international students applying to matriculate in Fall 2004 did so with awareness of
the H-1B policy change in October 2003. Although some applications were received in late summer 2003, the application
deadline was in January 2004.
235 Conclusion
To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to provide rigorous evidence on the eﬀects of restrictive
immigration policy on the quality of international students interested in US tertiary education. The
analysis employed two datasets: (i) College Board data on the SAT scores of prospective students; and
(ii) SAT and GPA data on a highly-selective university’s foreign-applicants. Both cases generate robust
evidence that limits on H-1B immigration of educated labor have had an unintended adverse eﬀect on
US higher education by reducing the average ability (or quality) of potential foreign applicants.
Unfortunately, a lack of available data prevents us from further investigating to what extent
the weakened pool of foreign applicants will translate into lower-quality matriculates and graduates.
Nonetheless, the key ﬁndings from our quintile regressions, combined with summary statistics from the
Institute for International Education, shed light on this issue. IIE data notes that US undergraduate
enrollment of students from countries bound by H-1B restrictions declined by 14% between academic
years 2001/02 and 2006/07. US policy-makers are unlikely to be concerned if such losses occur at
the left-tail of the ability distribution. Our analysis, however, shows that the share of applications
from top-quintile students declined by 1.8-3.7 percentage-points. It is unlikely that US undergraduate
institutions maintained a high number of top-quality international enrollees in the face of declining
applications from top-quality students.
Lower-quality foreign-born students would directly aﬀect the classroom experience for domestic
students whose education is often enriched by the presence of well-motivated, well-prepared, and di-
verse international classmates. Universities and their students therefore suﬀer an immediate welfare
loss due to restrictive immigration policy. Lower-quality graduates would imply even more important
macroeconomic consequences, however, since many international students continue to work in the US
after graduation. Such individuals have proven to be especially eﬀective in innovative and entrepre-
neurial activity, boosting aggregate productivity. With lower ability individuals seeking entry into the
US, the country may ultimately sacriﬁce those aggregate gains.
Given recent political developments in public opinion regarding highly-educated immigrants, it
is increasingly important to design policy to maximize the beneﬁt of skill-based immigration. By
providing evidence on a potentially serious adverse eﬀect of current H-1B immigration restrictions,
this paper points to a need for policy reassessment.
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Table 1: Average SAT Scores of Potential International Applicants by Type and Tier of School 
 
Note: Summary statistics of individual score reports sent by international SAT test-takers in academic years 2000-01 through 2007-08. Source: College Board sample data.
Top 10 Top 25 26 to 50 11 to 25 51 to 100 Other Tier 1 Tier 3 Tier 4
Research Mean 1280 1200 1128 1084 1055 1010
Std Dev 161 162 163 172 175 176
Obs 38061 17404 13638 3696 3452 2909
Liberal Arts Mean 1260 1216 1143 1129 1081 970
Std Dev 157 157 164 167 172 201
Obs 7940 3603 2027 628 769 363
Masters Mean 1099 1054 1034 1002 1012
Std Dev 160 174 178 182 193
Obs 2694 1359 3014 1821 1133
Baccalaureate Mean 1076 1016 966 1017 952
Std Dev 196 179 194 188 209
Obs 491 302 338 232 317
Within-Type Tier
Top Tier Middle Tier Bottom Tier Harmonized Tier30 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, College Board SAT Data 
 
Note: Summary statistics of individual score reports sent by international SAT test-takers in academic years 2000-01 through 2007-08. Source: 
College Board sample data. 
   
Variable Obsservations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SAT Math Score 106191 638 110 200 800
SAT Verbal Score 106191 552 106 200 800
SAT Total Score 106191 1190 189 410 1600
Female 106180 0.466 0.499 0 1
Intends to Play Intercollegiate Sports 106191 0.289 0.453 0 1
Sure to Apply for Aid 96293 0.601 0.490 0 1
Ultimately Wants Advanced Degree 95410 0.735 0.442 0 1
Bound by H-1B Visa Cap 106191 0.526 0.499 0 1
Asian 100924 0.490 0.500 0 1
Black 100924 0.097 0.295 0 1
Hispanic 100924 0.074 0.262 0 1
Other Non-White Race 100924 0.118 0.323 0 1
White 100924 0.221 0.415 0 1
Mother's Edu: Less than High School Degree 91777 0.062 0.241 0 1
Mother's Edu: HS Diploma 91777 0.121 0.326 0 1
Mother's Edu: Business School 91777 0.025 0.158 0 1
Mother's Edu: Some College or Assoc. Degree 91777 0.141 0.348 0 1
Mother's Edu: Bachelor's Degree 91777 0.356 0.479 0 1
Mother's Edu: Graduate Degree 91777 0.295 0.456 0 1
Father's Edu: Less than High School Degree 91652 0.046 0.209 0 1
Father's Edu: HS Diploma 91652 0.065 0.246 0 1
Father's Edu: Business School 91652 0.031 0.173 0 1
Father's Edu: Some College or Assoc. Degree 91652 0.085 0.279 0 1
Father's Edu: Bachelor's Degree 91652 0.318 0.466 0 1
Father's Edu: Graduate Degree 91652 0.455 0.498 0 1
Research University 106191 0.745 0.436 0 1
Liberal Arts College 106191 0.144 0.351 0 1
Masters-Granting University 106191 0.094 0.292 0 1
Baccalaureate School 106191 0.016 0.125 0 1
College Rank: Top Tier (Harmonized) 106191 0.661 0.473 0 1
College Rank: Middle Tier (Harmonized) 106191 0.235 0.424 0 1
College Rank: Bottom Tier (Harmonized) 106191 0.104 0.305 0 1
Private University 106191 0.694 0.461 0 1
College Location: New England 106191 0.223 0.416 0 1
College Location: Middle Atlantic 106191 0.282 0.450 0 1
College Location: Great Lakes 106191 0.127 0.333 0 1
College Location: Plains State 106191 0.035 0.184 0 1
College Location: Southeast 106191 0.132 0.339 0 1
College Location: Southwest 106191 0.038 0.191 0 1
College Location: Rocky Mountain 106191 0.008 0.089 0 1
College Location: Far West 106191 0.155 0.362 0 131 
 
Table 3: Baseline Results, College Board Data 
 
Note: Unit of observation is pseudo-school*country-of-origin*year. Regressions are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard 
errors are clustered by pseudo-school*country-of-origin cells.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable:
Bound by H-1B Visa Cap -8.503 -8.408 -7.617 -10.007 -9.840 -12.325 -18.510 -18.248 -19.942
(4.229)** (2.173)*** (1.840)*** (7.010) (2.381)*** (2.244)*** (6.200)*** (3.230)*** (3.109)***
% Sure to Apply for Aid 13.644 14.384 28.029
(1.570)*** (1.880)*** (2.861)***
% Intent to Play Intercollegiate Sports 0.348 -7.448 -7.100
(1.662) (1.733)*** (2.897)**
% Female -26.337 3.897 -22.439
(1.539)*** (1.687)** (2.688)***
% Asian 47.155 -22.539 24.616
(3.147)*** (3.730)*** (5.575)***
% Black -19.716 -30.511 -50.227
(4.686)*** (4.248)*** (7.925)***
% Hispanic -25.339 -24.383 -49.722
(4.629)*** (4.495)*** (7.822)***
% Other Non-White Race 2.078 -26.713 -24.635
(3.400) (3.599)*** (6.010)***
% Ultimately Wants Advanced Degree 17.592 17.308 34.900
(1.680)*** (1.856)*** (3.029)***
Mother's Edu: % HS DIPLOMA -7.149 13.395 6.246
(3.616)** (4.399)*** (6.891)
Mother's Edu: % BUSINESS SCHOOL -16.993 18.339 1.345
(5.133)*** (5.810)*** (9.532)
Mother's Edu: % SOME COLLEGE or ASSOC -3.355 17.518 14.163
(3.448) (4.488)*** (6.641)**
Mother's Edu: % BACHELORS DEGREE or SOME GRAD 2.769 27.635 30.404
(3.246) (4.118)*** (6.182)***
Mother's Edu: % GRAD DEGREE 2.503 29.630 32.133
(3.519) (4.364)*** (6.650)***
Father's Edu: %  HS DIPLOMA 1.712 0.725 2.438
(4.048) (4.886) (7.748)
Father's Edu: %  BUSINESS SCHOOL 1.270 20.126 21.396
(4.786) (5.763)*** (8.875)**
Father's Edu: %  SOME COLLEGE or ASSOC 10.280 8.470 18.750
(3.915)*** (4.692)* (7.376)**
Father's Edu: %  BACHELORS DEGREE or SOME GRAD 22.387 21.574 43.961
(3.598)*** (4.273)*** (6.685)***
Father's Edu: %  GRAD DEGREE 25.834 38.254 64.088
(3.593)*** (4.184)*** (6.597)***
Additional Fixed Effects: Year Year Year
School School School
Country Country Country
Observations 36218 36218 30797 36218 36218 30797 36218 36218 30797
R-squared 0.58 0.68 0.72 0.4 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.69
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
School*Country School*Country School*Country
Math SAT Score Verbal SAT Score Total SAT Score
Year Year Year32 
 
Table 4: Baseline Results, Dependent Variables Measured in Logs 
 
Note: Unit of observation is pseudo-school*country-of-origin*year. Regressions are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard 
errors are clustered by pseudo-school*country-of-origin cells.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable:
Bound by H-1B Visa Cap -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.016 -0.016 -0.021 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
(0.007)* (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.014) (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
% Sure to Apply for Aid 0.023 0.027 0.024
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)***
% Intent to Play Intercollegiate Sports 0.001 -0.012 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003)*** (0.003)**
% Female -0.044 0.008 -0.019
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
% Asian 0.075 -0.043 0.021
(0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)***
% Black -0.039 -0.058 -0.047
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
% Hispanic -0.044 -0.044 -0.044
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)***
% Other Non-White Race 0.000 -0.051 -0.023
(0.006) (0.007)*** (0.005)***
% Ultimately Wants Advanced Degree 0.030 0.033 0.032
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)***
Mother's Edu: % HS DIPLOMA -0.011 0.028 0.007
(0.006)* (0.009)*** (0.006)
Mother's Edu: % BUSINESS SCHOOL -0.028 0.035 0.000
(0.009)*** (0.012)*** (0.009)
Mother's Edu: % SOME COLLEGE or ASSOC -0.004 0.034 0.014
(0.006) (0.009)*** (0.006)**
Mother's Edu: % BACHELORS DEGREE or SOME GRAD 0.005 0.054 0.027
(0.006) (0.008)*** (0.006)***
Mother's Edu: % GRAD DEGREE 0.005 0.057 0.029
(0.006) (0.009)*** (0.006)***
Father's Edu: %  HS DIPLOMA 0.005 -0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Father's Edu: %  BUSINESS SCHOOL 0.005 0.037 0.020
(0.009) (0.011)*** (0.008)**
Father's Edu: %  SOME COLLEGE or ASSOC 0.020 0.014 0.018
(0.007)*** (0.009) (0.007)***
Father's Edu: %  BACHELORS DEGREE or SOME GRAD 0.043 0.042 0.043
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)***
Father's Edu: %  GRAD DEGREE 0.048 0.073 0.060
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)***
Additional Fixed Effects: Year Year Year
School School School
Country Country Country
Observations 36218 36218 30797 36218 36218 30797 36218 36218 30797
R-squared 0.57 0.67 0.72 0.4 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.65 0.69
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
School*Country School*Country School*Country
ln(Math SAT Score) ln(Verbal SAT Score) ln(Total SAT Score)
Year Year Year33 
 
Table 5: Timing of Policy and SAT Score Response, Varied Approaches  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 









Bound by H-1B Visa 
Cap  -9.908  0.105  -9.804  -15.932  -9.583  -13.652 
   (2.313)***  (2.675)  (3.638)***  (4.017)***  (3.509)***  (3.950)*** 
Observations  36218  36218  36218  36218  36218  36218 
R-Squared  0.69  0.57  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67 
                    
                    
Dependent Variable:  ln(Math)  ln(Verbal)  ln(SAT)  ln(SAT)  ln(SAT)  ln(SAT) 
Bound by H-1B Visa 
Cap  -0.014  0.003  -0.006  -0.011  -0.006  -0.009 
   (0.004)***  (0.005)  (0.003)**  (0.003)***  (0.003)**  (0.003)*** 
Observations  36218  36218  36218  36218  36218  36218 
R-Squared  0.68  0.57  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%          
Fixed Effects: SAT Date, School*Country             
 
Note: Unit of observation is pseudo-school*country-of-origin*year. Regressions are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard errors are clustered by pseudo-school*country-of-
origin cells. Estimates assume different dates for individual responses to announced policy changes as described in the text. 34 
 
Table 6: Controlling for Macroeconomic Conditions 



















Dependent Variable:  Average SAT Score 
Bound by H-1B Visa Cap  -9.553  -14.958  -7.735  -11.204  -9.139 
   (3.856)**  (4.953)***  (4.229)*  (4.943)**  (3.841)** 
Binding*OECD Member              9.004 
               (5.011)* 
ln(Weighted US Industry GDP)              582.002 
               (280.383)** 
Observations  32331  33844  35341  20789  33305 
R-Squared  0.67  0.66  0.65  0.67  0.66 
                 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Average SAT Score) 
Bound by H-1B Visa Cap  -0.006  -0.010  -0.005  -0.007  -0.006 
   (0.003)*  (0.004)**  (0.004)  (0.004)*  (0.003)* 
Binding*OECD Member              0.007 
               (0.004) 
ln(Weighted US Industry GDP)              0.333 
               (0.253) 
Observations  32331  33844  35341  20789  33305 
R-Squared  0.67  0.66  0.66  0.66  0.66 
 
Note: Unit of observation is pseudo-school*country-of-origin*year. All regressions include SAT Date and school*country fixed effects, and are weighted by population number of score reports. 
Standard errors are clustered by pseudo-school*country-of-origin cells. Weighted US GDP calculation described in text. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 35 
 
Table 7: Results by College Type & Tier 
 
Note: Unit of observation is pseudo-school*country-of-origin*year. Regressions are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard errors are clustered by pseudo-school*country-of-
origin cells. 
 
   
Research -7.537 Top -8.466 General Effect -14.061
(3.897)* (4.047)** (3.957)***
Liberal Arts -16.547 Middle -13.165 Differential for Top Research Schools 8.411
(5.389)*** (4.958)*** (4.205)**




Observations 36218 Observations 36218 Observations 36218
R-Squared 0.67 R-Squared 0.67 R-Squared 0.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fixed Effects: SAT Date, School*Country
Type & Tier Specific Coefficients on Binding H-1B Policy
Dependent Variable: Average SAT Score
School Type School Tier School Type & Tier36 
 
Table 8: Effect of Restrictive H-1B Policy on Demographic Composition of Prospective International Students 
 
Note: Unit of observation is pseudo-school*country-of-origin*year. Regressions are weighted by population number of score reports. Standard errors are clustered by pseudo-school*country-of-
origin cells.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: % Female % Asian % Black % Hispanic % White % Sure to Pursue 
Advanced Degree
% Sure to Apply 
for Aid
Bound by H-1B Visa Cap 0.005 -0.076 -0.001 -0.003 0.059 0.084 0.044
(0.011) (0.014)*** (0.004) (0.003) (0.014)*** (0.017)*** (0.012)***
Observations 36213 35226 35226 35226 35226 33763 34079
R2 0.31 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.76 0.30 0.44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fixed Effects: SAT Date, School*Country37 
 
Table 9: Coefficients on Restrictive H-1B Policy by Quintile of the International Student Ability Distribution 
Quintile:  Bottom  2nd  Middle  4th  Top 
(SAT Score Range)  (400 - 1000)  (1010 - 1120)  (1130 - 1220)  (1230 - 1320)  (1330-1600) 
                 
   Panel A: Baseline Quintile Results 
Dependent Variable:    
Share of SAT Score Reports  -0.032  0.018  -0.008  0.040  -0.018 
   (0.013)**  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.012)***  (0.011)* 
                 
Share of Average SAT Score   -0.065  0.016  -0.018  -0.002  -0.038 
  Reports Received Over Time  (0.015)***  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013)*** 
                 
                 
   Panel B: Controlling for Average Number of Applications per Applicant 
Dependent Variable:                
Share of SAT Score Reports  -0.033  0.018  -0.008  0.041  -0.018 
   (0.013)**  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.012)***  (0.011)* 
                 
Share of Average SAT Score   -0.065  0.016  -0.018  -0.002  -0.037 
  Reports Received Over Time  (0.015)***  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013)*** 
 
Note: Unit of observation is pseudo-school*country-of-origin*year. Each cell represents the coefficient (and standard error) on binding H-1B policy from a unique regression defined by the quintile, 
dependent variable, and additional controls. Dependent variable “Share of SAT Score Reports” measures the proportion of score reports received by a school s from citizens of country c at time t by 
each quintile of the international student ability distribution (as determined in the pre-binding policy period). Dependent variable “Share of Average SAT Reports Received Over Time” measures the 
number of score reports received by a school s from citizens of country c at time t by each quintile of the international student ability distribution, normalized by the average total number of reports 
received by s from c across time. All regressions include SAT Date and school*country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by pseudo-school*country-of-origin cells. More details are available 
in the text. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 10: Case Study of Applicants to a Highly-Selective University 
 
Note: Unit of observation is country-of-origin*year. Regressions are weighted by number of applicants. Standard errors are clustered by country of origin.  
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Bound by H-1B Visa Cap -13.284 -0.481 -13.765 -0.093
(4.992)*** (6.396) (10.454) (0.038)**
Observations 612 612 612 612
R-squared 0.85 0.65 0.75 0.68
Bound by H-1B Visa Cap -0.022 0 -0.012 -0.028
(0.008)*** (0.011) (0.008) (0.012)**
Observations 612 612 612 612
R-squared 0.84 0.64 0.73 0.65
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fixed Effects: Country and Academic Year
Constant and Other Coefficients Suppressed
Dependent Variable Measured in Levels
Dependent Variable Measured in Logs39 
 
Figure 1: H-1B Issuances and Undergraduate Enrollment 
 
Note: Graph displays predicted values and residuals of H-1B Issuances (in Fiscal Year 2006) for a cross-country regression on Undergraduate 
Enrollment (Academic Year 2001/02) and Population (2002), all measured in logs. Regression omits Canada since its citizens only need to meet 
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ln(Undergraduate Enrollment, Academic Year 2001/02)
Cleaned of Effects from ln(Population)
ln(H-1B Issuances) and ln(Undergraduate Enrollment)40 
 
 
Figure 2: Visa Issuances 
     
 
     
Note: Charts describe the number of new visa issuances by type and country since 2000 (Source US 
State Department). College-educated citizens from Canada, Mexico, Australia, Chile, and Singapore have 
viable alternatives to the H1B visa. Canadian citizens do not require H-1B or TN visas to work in the 
United States, but do need to meet H-1B or TN criteria. 
 


















































































Note: Scatterplot records the average of the 1st and 3rd quartile SAT scores of enrolled students and the 
2009 US News and World Reports America’s Best Colleges rank of 195 national research universities and 
liberal arts colleges. A bivariate regression would produce a coefficient on Average SAT Score of -0.293 
and an R






















1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
Average SAT Score
Research Universities Liberal Arts Colleges
SAT Scores and College Rank